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## WHAT IS IT?

Conventional wisdom posits that cooperation between state actors and criminals, operating in domestic environments, can most easily be explained as a function of weak capacity or corruption. In contrast, this model helps to illustrate how cooperation can emerge over time as a function: (1) the state's inability to eradicate crime completely, and; (2) the empirical reality that policies of eradication are often associated with higher levels of disorganized, as opposed to organized crime, and thus higher levels of negative externalities.

The model is based off of both theoretical (formal modeling) work completed by Celentani, Massino and Martina (1995), and real world empirical findings from studies carried out by Professor Jonson Porteux in East Asia. The model is an attempt at expanding upon existing models by specifically illustrating the adaption of actors to varying institutional environments and levels of capacity, as well as adding to the generalizable reach and robustness of research based findings by Professor Jonson Porteux.

The reasons for cooperation between state actors and criminals might be unclear. However, Professor Jonson Porteux has been studying (especially in South-Korea) why the state would collaborate/cooperate with groups that are non-state specialists in violence (not limited to mafias, paramilitary groups, vigilantes, etc.). Theoretically they don't want to, but for practical reasons, at times, they have to. His main argument is that collaboration with non-state specialists is one observable implication of a state's varying level of capacity. If the state lacks a sufficient jurisdiction, an “Enforcement Partnership” can be made; “Violation of agreements, high entrepreneurial risk caused by frequent non-payment of debts and failure to observe contracts, in addition to the spread of swindling and theft produces a demand for an "enforcement partnership" between the government and criminals. Such outcomes is a result of legitimate state institutions being incapable of reducing such risks due to poor definition of property rights, the inefficiency of the state courts of justice in resolving disputed, and their incapacity to enforce decisions“.

The model demonstrates how strategies of reciprocity can bring about favorable outcomes. The 'state' or (police as proxies of political elites), set a threshold of economic rents that criminal firms are allowed to earn. If criminal firms expand their earnings past this threshold, the police inflict a cost on them.

## HOW IT WORKS

At the beginning, there's no collaboration between the government and criminals.

Whether the government will cooperate or work against criminals, depends on economic parameters, as well as a cultural aspect.

A cooperation will occur if the criminals reach an economic turnover (or monetary stack) higher than a critical benchmark. This benchmark is defined by the criminals share of the government’s turnover, and the governments’ will to cooperate with criminals, defined as the cultural aspect.

Adjust the sliders according to the case you want to simulate. If the criminals reaches a big enough share of the total economic turnover, a partnership occur. This can increase the economic growth for both the criminals and the government. In the case of an partnership, assumable the government will get most of the benefits, as they now will have a more well-functioning state.

## HOW TO USE IT

The interactive variables

endowment?
- This is an exogenous variable, which you can use to simulate the dynamics of the economy.

economic-growth-for-gov-and-criminals
- This variable affects the criminals and the government with the same amount.

extra-economic-growth-for-criminals
- To adjust the extra economic-growth just for the criminals.

economic-growth-for-gov-due-to-fighting-crime
- Economic gain from reducing crime.

economic-loss-for-criminals-due-to-gov-fighting-crime
- Economic loss for criminals due to reduced economic activity.

initial-number-criminals
- To adjust the amount of criminals in the beginning of the interaction.

initial-number-governmentagents
- To adjust the amount of government agents in the beginning of the interaction.

initial-state-strengt
- Decides the wealth of the government agents. A higher value will delay the timing of a possible partnership, as it will take a longer amount of time before the criminals share of the total monetary stock is above a certain benchmark.

govs-propensity-to-cooperate-with-criminals
- Decides the benchmark for when partnership between the criminals and the government starts. A higher propensity for the gov to cooperate with criminals lowers the criminals' share of the total monetary value needed before a partnership will takes place.

benefits-or-costs-of-cooperation-for-the-criminals:
- To adjust the benefits or costs the criminals will get by reaching the benchmark for cooperation.

benefits-or-costs-of-cooperation-for-the-government:
- To adjust the benefits or costs the government will get by having a partnership with criminal agents.

Monitor

Shows the economic turnover/monetary stock/profit of the criminals and the government.

## THINGS TO NOTICE

How usable the model is to different situations.
How the interaction variables may affect the outcome in the monitor according the studies of Professor Jonson Porteux.

## THINGS TO TRY

1) Try to set the model such that their are no cooperation. Then increase the economic growth of the criminals to trigger a cooperation.

2) Find a set-up which triggers a cooperation. Try to adjust the govs-propensity-to-cooperate-with-criminals and see how the cultural aspect influences the timing of the cooperation.

## THINGS TO NOTICE

How usable the model is to different situations.
How the interaction variables may affect the outcome in the monitor according the research of Professor Jonson Porteux and the CMM.

## RELATED MODELS

"The Mafia Model - Interaction between police, mafia and storewoners" also named "Affecting Mafia With Social Norms"
http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/models/community/The%20Mafia%20Model%20-%20Interaction%20between%20police,%20mafia%20and%20storewoners

"Mafianomics"
http://web.econ.unito.it/terna/tesine/mafianomics.htm

## CREDITS AND REFERENCES

Model made by Adrian Haugen Ordemann under collaboration with Professor Jonson Porteux and Benedito Faustinoni.

Contact: ordemanna@gmail.com

Based on;
- The work of Professor Jonson Porteux - Hosei University
- The CMM in chapter 10 in the book "The Economics of organized crime" by Gianluca Fiorentini and Sam Peltzma

Partly built on "The Mafia Model - Interaction between police, mafia and storewoners" also named "Affecting Mafia With Social Norms" http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/models/community/The%20Mafia%20Model%20-%20Interaction%20between%20police,%20mafia%20and%20storewoners